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The best theory of compositional semantics should cohere with the
general theory of speech acts, including the theory of assertion, and the
broader systematization of linguistic communication. This is so, even
though the way in which these disciplines fit together and interact is not
always clearly articulated. Something would clearly have gone wrong
if our theory of what our sentences mean didn’t fit naturally with our
theory of the things we say by the act uttering those sentences.
Roughly speaking, when someone makes an assertion by uttering
a sentence φ, they offer up some information for their audience to
consider.1 This information that is offered up is the content of the
utterance, i.e. it is what is said by the act of uttering the sentence φ.
Let’s call what is said by the utterance of a sentence the assertoric
content of a sentence. I intend “the assertoric content of a sentence (in
a context)” to mean roughly the same thing as the following phrases:2
∗ Thanks to Dilip Ninan, Derek Ball, Clas Weber, David Chalmers, Landon
Rabern, Jonathan Schaffer, Wolfgang Schwarz, John Cusbert, Rhiannon Rabern,
Daniel Nolan, Mark Jago, Rachael Briggs, Augustus Pablo, and Albert Atkin. An
early version of this material was presented while visiting Arche´ in St. Andrews
and the paper benefited from the many discussions in and around the Central.
A later version was presented at the Propositions and Same-Saying workshop at
the University of Sydney, July 19-21, 2010. Thanks also to the audience and the
organizers of the workshop.
1 I want to stay neutral on the nature of assertion here – except for the claim
that assertions have content. One can substitute in their favorite theory of assertion,
e.g. to make an assertion is to propose to add information to the common ground,
or it is to undertake a commitment to the truth of a proposition, or it is to express
an attitude toward a propositional content. For a theorist who denies a role for
the theoretical notion of the content of assertion, the questions raised in this essay
regarding the relationship between compositionality and assertoric content will not
be so pressing. Nevertheless, there is still the question about how compositional
semantics relates to the act of assertion.
2 Likewise, this is what Yalcin (2007) means by “the informational content of an
assertion” and what Egan (2007) means by “the content of an assertive utterance”
and what Stanley (1997) and Ninan (forthcoming b) mean by “assertoric content”.
c© 2011 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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− der von einem Satz ausgedru¨ckte Gedanke [Frege (1892)]
− the proposition expressed by an utterance [Moore (1927)]
− “what is said” by an utterance [Kaplan (1989a)]
− what an assertion adds to the common ground [Stalnaker (1978)3]
− the propositional content of an utterance [Lewis (1980)]
− the information content contained in a sentence [Salmon (1986)]
− the proposition expressed by a sentence [King (2007)]
The assertoric content of a sentence somehow depends on the expres-
sions that are its syntactic constituents. For example, an utterance of
‘Some monkeys have tails’ asserts something very different from an
utterance of ‘Some donkeys have tails’ – and anyone who knows what
an utterance of ‘Some monkeys have tails’ asserts and understands
‘donkey’, will thereby know what an utterance of ‘Some donkeys have
tails’ asserts. So by systematically substituting meaningful words into
grammatical forms we are able to produce infinitely many novel sen-
tences, the utterances of which are understandable by members of our
linguistic community.
These phenomena call for an explanation. The hypothesis that our
natural languages are compositional is standardly thought to be the
best explanation. The principle of compositionality can be glossed as
the principle that the meaning of any complex expression is determined
by the meanings of it parts and the way they are put together. This is
more carefully defined as follows.
Principle of Compositionality.4 Let m be the function that maps
an expression α to itsmeaning. Then for every syntactic ruleR there is a
semantic operation fR such thatm[R(α1, α2, ..., αn)] = fR[m(α1),m(α2),
. . . ,m(αn)].
5
3 Roughly, the common ground of a conversation is the set of mutually (and
knowingly) presupposed propositions. And the speech act of assertion has the effect
of updating the common ground of the conversation by adding the content of the
assertion.
4 This is the formulation of basic compositionality, Funct(µ), provided in Pagin
and Westerst˚ahl (2010).
5 To define syntactic rule let Γ be the set of well-formed expressions of L (includ-
ing the atomic expressions). Each syntactic rule R is a partial function that maps
tuples of members of Γ to a member of Γ, e.g. RNP maps the nominal ‘monkey’ and
the determiner ‘the’ to the noun phrase ‘the monkey’.
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But what do we mean by “meaning” in this definition? Assume we un-
derstand the “meaning” of a sentence to be what is said by utterances
of it. Is the assertoric content of a sentence determined by the assertoric
contents of its parts and the syntax?6 Prima facie, that seems right.
Consider some examples: (i) What is said by an utterance of ‘Oregon
is south of Washington and Oregon is north of California’ seems to
depend on the assertoric contents of ‘Oregon is south of Washington’
and ‘Oregon is north of California’; (ii) What is said by an utterance of
‘Atticus believes that mirrors are windows into an alternate universe’
seems to depend on the assertoric content of ‘Mirrors are windows into
an alternate universe’.
Surveying a wider array of examples, however, casts doubt on this
initial appearance. In fact, there is a general tension between various
contextualist theories of assertoric content and this compositionality
principle. In slogan form we can say that the problem arises when
expressions that say the same thing embed differently. Or to be a bit
more precise the problem arises when the following conditions are met.
Failure of compositionality of assertoric content. (i) φ and ψ
have the same assertoric content at c and, (ii) there is a linguistic
environment Σ such that Σ(φ) and Σ(ψ) do not have the same
assertoric content at c.7
To get a common example of this type of failure on the table consider
the following two sentences.
6 Do subsentential expressions even have assertoric content? It is usually assumed
that they do. This is what is often called their “content”, “semantic content”,
or “propositional contribution”. For example, this is what is being invoked when
theorists ask “What do names contribute to the propositions expressed by sentences
they occur in?”. This issue, of course, is tied up with issues surrounding compo-
sitionality, so I don’t want to prejudge the issue. If one insists that the notion
of assertoric content only makes sense for sentences, note that everything in this
paper can be done in terms of the assertoric contents of sentences (which occur as
syntactic constituents of complex sentences, e.g. in section §1 I could talk about the
sentence ‘Fx’ instead of the variable ‘x’). For the purpose of the paper I will talk
as if non-sentences have assertoric contents but my official position is that we can,
if we want to, assign assertoric contents to non-sentential expressions – even though
with respect to issues surrounding compositionality we need not.
7 To be more careful let A be the function that takes an expression φ and a context
c and gives the assertoric content of φ in c. The compositionality of assertoric content
fails iff it is not the case that for every syntactic rule R there is a semantic operation
fR such that A[R(φ1, φ2, ..., φn), c] = fR[A(φ1, c), A(φ2, c), ..., A(φn, c)]. See Pagin
and Westerst˚ahl (2010) for various formulations of the compositionality principle,
including principles like this which accommodate context-sensitivity.
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(1) It is raining.
(2) It is raining now.
Many theorists will insist that these two sentences say the same thing
in the sense that at time t they both express the eternal proposition to
the effect that it is raining at t.8 But now consider sentences (1) and
(2) embedded under the past tense operator PAST.9
(3) [[PAST] [it is raining]]
(4) [[PAST] [it is raining now]]
It is clear that (3) and (4) do not have the same assertoric content at
t. While the truth of what is said by an utterance of (3) at t depends
on the weather situations of times prior to t, the truth of (4) at t
only depends on the weather situation at t. So we have a conflict
between the eternalist commitments about assertoric content and the
compositionality principle in terms of assertoric content.10
This general pattern crops up all across semantic theorizing, since
certain commitments about assertoric content do not always play nice
with the semantics of embedded clauses. I will now briefly rehearse
some of the most discussed cases. The reader should keep these cases
in mind throughout the paper and I will return to these at the end when
summing up the general methodological lessons. In each of the examples
below, the contextualist commitment on assertoric content comes into
conflict with the compositionality principle, when the context-sensitive
expressions are embedded in a more complex sentence.
There is a conflict between contextualism about epistemic modals
and the semantics of embedded modals. The contextualist holds that,
in a given context, utterances of sentences (5.1) and (5.2) assert the
same thing.11 But this conflicts with the compositional semantics of
sentence (5.3) where (5.1) occurs as a syntactic constituent.
8 The many theorists include (e.g.) Richard (1982), Salmon (1986), King (2003)
among many others (and we could plausibly include Frege (1892)).
9 PAST has the same semantics as Prior’s tense operator P = ‘It has been the
case that’: “...the past-tense statement ‘It has been the case that Professor Carnap
is flying to the moon’, that is, ‘Professor Carnap has been flying to the moon’ is true
if and only if the present-tense statement ‘Professor Carnap is flying to the moon’
has been true.” Prior (1957), p. 9.
10 There are many important subtleties that I am glossing over here. See Weber
(this volume) for a careful and detailed analyses of the conflict between eternalism
and the compositional semantics of tense. See also King (2003).
11 See Egan et al. (2005) and Weatherson (2008) for a discussion of contextualism
about epistemic modals and the problems of embedding.
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(5.1) Dave might be in Oxford.
(5.2) It is consistent with what I know that Dave is in Oxford.
(5.3) Leon said that Dave might be in Oxford.
Likewise, there is a conflict between perpectivialism about taste claims
and the semantics of embedded taste claims. The perspectivalist holds
that, in a given context, utterances of sentence (6.1) and (6.2) assert the
same thing.12 But this causes trouble for the compositional semantics
of sentence (6.3).
(6.1) Licorice is tasty.
(6.2) Licorice is tasty to me.
(6.3) According to Jonathan Licorice is tasty.
For a final illustration of the conflict consider the direct reference the-
ory of indexicals and the semantics of bound pronouns.13 The direct
reference theorist holds that, in a given context, utterances of sentence
(7.1) and (7.2) assert the same thing. But this causes trouble for the
compositional semantics of sentence (7.3).
(7.1) He is mortal. (where Socrates is the salient male)
(7.2) Socrates is mortal.
(7.3) Every man is such that he is mortal.
I do not mean to suggest that there is no way to resolve these conflicts.14
There are, in fact, many strategies to pursue. Below are the main
options in broad outline.
Deny compositionality. Give up or significantly alter the com-
positionality principle.
12 See Schaffer (forthcoming).
13 The problem is even more acute, if we consider the semantics of “shiftable
pronouns” (see Schlenker (2003)) and monstrous operators or the semantics of free
variables and variable-binding. Consider Heim-sentences like “Only I got a question
I understood” or “Foxes have holes, and every bird its nest, I, only I, must wander
wearily, And bruise My feet, and drink wine salt with tears” (from Oscar Wilde’s
poem Easter Day).
14 The tension arises for other contextualist theories as well, e.g. contextualism
about gradable adjectives (‘tall’), epistemic contextualism, moral contextualism, etc.
Another case which doesn’t have much to do with contextualism is from Dummett
(1991), p.48: φ and TRUE(φ) say the same thing. But in a three valued logic ¬φ and
¬TRUE(φ) can differ in truth-value, since if φ is neuter so is ¬φ but ¬TRUE(φ) is true.
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Deny contextualism. Give up the relevant “contextualist” com-
mitment on assertoric content.15
Deny embedment. Deny that the sentences (or expressions gen-
erally) syntactically embed in the relevant environments.16
Deny innocence.Deny semantic innocence and opt for an occurrence-
based semantics or a multi-valued semantics.17
Deny identification. Give up the identification of assertoric con-
tent with compositional semantic value.
It is not my primary aim in this paper to argue that most of these
options are untenable. I will, however, just mention that if one wants to
keep certain theoretical commitments about the contents of assertion,
which aren’t held hostage to certain syntactic theories, while retaining
semantic innocence and a strong form of the compositionality principle,
then denying the identification thesis is the preferred option. This is
the option I want to explore. Since I will often be referring to this thesis
and its denial, let’s explicitly state it.
15 For example, if one denies contextualism about epistemic modals and instead
adopts a relativistic conception of assertoric content along the lines of Egan (2007)
the tension dissolves. Likewise, in the tense case, if one gives up the relevant contex-
tualist commitment (i.e. eternalism) and instead follows Kaplan (1989a) by adopting
temporalism the problem disappears.
16 For example, in the tense example above King (2003) insists that sentences (1)
and (2) do not actually occur as syntactic constituents of the past tense versions
of the sentences. (This is what Lewis (1980) calls the schmentencite strategy.) In
this way, the assertoric content/compositional value of (1) and (2) can be said to be
the same eternal proposition (see Weber (this volume)). Is it plausible that the true
nature of the objects of assertion is decided by the correct syntactic representation
of tense?
17 By occurrence-based semantics I mean a view on which we don’t assign seman-
tic values to expressions in isolation but only relative to a linguistic enviornment
(cf. Salmon (2006)). Also included here are semantic theories influenced by Frege’s
machinery of referential shift, where the semantic value of an expression shifts when
embedded in certain environments (e.g. ungerade environments). Depending on how
this option is actually carried out it will most likely also fall under Deny composi-
tionality. David Chalmers (p.c.) has suggested the related option of having semantic
values/assertoric contents be e.g. tuples consisting of both an eternal proposition and
a temporal proposition. In this way the assertoric content of ‘It is raining’ would be
an entity consisting of an eternal and temporal proposition and temporal operators
could operate on this complex entity. This idea is worth pursuing but notice that
it brings with it certain controversial commitments on assertoric content, i.e. the
things we say are ordered pairs of temporal and eternal propositions. See Chalmers
(forthcoming) for some related ideas.
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Identification thesis. The compositional semantic value of an expres-
sion is identical to its assertoric content.
An underlying motivation for this paper is this insight: by denying the
identification thesis we can free up the theoretical notion of assertoric
content from the confines of compositionality and free up compositional
semantics from the confines of the theory of assertion.
The overall plan for the essay is to outline the theoretical picture
that results from denying the identification thesis and to see if there
are any devastating objections to such a view. I will argue that there
are not. But first in §1 I will present in more detail a paradigmatic ex-
ample of a failure of compositionality. I will show that Kaplan’s formal
language LD – the logic of demonstratives – exemplifies a failure of the
compositionality of assertoric content (i.e. it is not compositional at the
level of Kaplanian content). This failure is due to a tension between the
compositional semantics of quantification and Kaplan’s direct reference
commitments on the assertoric content of variables. In §2 I will then
present the picture of semantic theorizing that denies the identification
thesis – a picture explicated and endorsed by Lewis (1980). From this
theoretical perspective the apparent tensions – outlined above – be-
tween the various contextualist theories and compositionality dissolves.
Finally, in §3 I will address a worry about such a view having to do
with the semantics of speech reports (and attitude reports generally)
raised in King (2003) – the mismatch worry. I will show that this type
of worry is not in the end threatening. In so doing, I will address King’s
charge (aimed at Salmon (1986)) that denying the identification thesis
gives rise to complications with the interaction of temporal operators
and attitude reports.
1. Kaplanian content and compositionality
1.1. Kaplanian content
The Kaplanian content of an expression at a context c is the proposi-
tional contribution that the expression makes in c. For Kaplan (1989a)
this means two things:
(T1) The content of an expression in a context c is “what is said”
or expressed by an expression in c.
(T2) The content of any complex expression in c is determined by
the contents (in c) of its syntactic constituents and the way they
are put together.
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Kaplan is very explicit about (T1) but he is not as explicit about (T2).18
It is clear, however, that he endorses both theses. A commitment to
(T2) is implicit both when discussing what is known as the operator
argument in connection with temporal and locational operators and
when he is discussing monstrous operators.
When discussing his notion of content Kaplan insists that contents
cannot be specific with respect to time, since if they were this would
give the wrong result for the the compositional semantics of temporal
operators.
If we built the time of evaluation into the contents..., it would make
no sense to have temporal operators. To put the point another way,
if what is said is thought of as incorporating reference to a specific
time...it is otiose to ask whether what is said would have been true
at another time...Temporal operators applied to eternal sentences
(those whose contents incorporate a specific time of evaluation) are
redundant ((Kaplan, 1989a), p. 503).
The argument here is that if the contents of sentences (in context)
are specific with respect to time then all temporal operators would
be vacuous – but not all temporal operators are vacuous. Thus, the
contents of sentences (in context) are neutral with respect to time. A
premise in this argument is the thesis that the content of a sentence in
a context (i.e. what is said by the sentence) is what temporal operators
operate on.19
One could resist the conclusion that the things we say are tempo-
rally neutral by denying the premise that temporal operators operate
on the contents of their embedded sentences. Instead, one could insist
that temporal operators operate on functions from times to assertoric
contents.20 But to do so would be to give up the identification thesis
(T2) – that the assertoric content of a sentence in a context c is a
function of the assertoric contents (in c) of its syntactic constituents.
Kaplan does not opt for this maneuver even though he notices that his
commitments on content (what is said) are in tension with a classical
eternalist conception of content.21 Since he accepts the argument from
18 Kaplan never actually uses the term “compositionality”, instead he talks about
what kinds of “semantic operations” exist in the language.
19 This premise is explicitly stated a few lines earlier when he says: “Operators
of the familiar kind treated in intensional logic (modal, temporal, etc.) operate
on contents. (Since we represent contents by intensions, it is not surprising that
intensional operators operate on contents)”. Kaplan (1989a), p. 502, emphasis added.
20 Cf. Salmon (1986) and Richard (1982).
21 He says, “This functional notion of the content of a sentence in a context may
not, because of the neutrality of content with respect to time and place, say, exactly
correspond to the classical conception of a proposition. But the classical conception
assc_new.tex; 28/01/2011; 12:46; p.8
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premises about compositionality to conclusions about asserted content,
it seems he must be assuming that the semantic composition rules are
defined over assertoric contents.
We can also see Kaplan’s commit to (T2) is in his famous discussion
ofmonsters. Monsters are operators which take characters as argument,
e.g. “To the left” is monstrous, on the assumption that “To the left, I
am hungry” is true in a context c just in case the agent to the left of
the speaker in c is hungry.22 Kaplan claims that there are no monsters
in English.23
Operators like ‘In some contexts it is true that’, which attempt to
meddle with character, I call monsters. I claim that none can be
expressed in English...And such operators could not be added to it.
((Kaplan, 1989a), p. 511.)
The monster prohibition can be understood as a thesis about the com-
positional mechanisms of the language. Within the Kaplanian frame-
work it is equivalent to the claim that all operators in the language
are either extensional or intensional operators – that is there are no
hyperintensional semantic operations.24
can be introduced by adding the demonstratives ‘now’ and ‘here’ to the sentence and
taking the content of the result. I will continue to refer to the content of a sentence as
a proposition, ignoring the classical use.” Kaplan (1989a), p. 504. Its not clear what
he means by “introduce” but here he comes very close to making the distinction
between compositional content and assertoric content where the assertoric content
of a sentence is the same as what its compositional content would be if ‘now’ and
‘here’ operators were added to it.
22 This example is due to Gareth Evans. See Evans (2004) (which is a letter dated
14 July, 1979, written to Martin Davies in response to a draft of “Two notions of
necessity”) and Evans (1985) pp. 357-358, where Evans discusses what he calls a
hitherto unknown form of embedding : “Suppose that there is a language exactly like
English, save that it possesses two additional operators, ‘To the right’, and ‘To the
left’, which can be prefixed to sentences in the first person. A sentence like ‘To the
left (I am hot)’ as uttered by a speaker x at t is true iff there is at t on x’s left
someone moderately near who is hot.”
23 This has been challenge by some recent empirical linguistics, see, for example,
Schlenker (2003), Anand and Nevins (2004), and Sauerland and Schenner (2009).
24 By a “hyperintensional operator” I mean operators which map intensionally
equivalent expressions to different values. Within the Kaplan framework intensions
are function from circumstances (i.e. tuples of worlds and times (and perhaps loca-
tions)) to extensions. For Kaplan the only hyperintensional operators on his radar
are character-operators. But, of course, one could modify Kaplan’s framework such
that there where operators, which were non-monstrous, in the sense of not being
character-operators, but were also hyperintensional operators. For example, quota-
tional operators or operators that operate on the syntax of their embedded clause
– perhaps “ is so-called because of his size”. Also included here are operators
on structured meanings (cf. Lewis (1970)) – whether these operate on structures
of intensions or structures of characters, they will not be “merely intensional” in
assc_new.tex; 28/01/2011; 12:46; p.9
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Monster prohibition (Compositionality Formulation).25 There
is no operator (or quantifier) Σ of a natural language L such that
JΣφKc,i fails to be a function of λi.JφKc,i.
Kaplan himself glosses his monster prohibition as the thesis that “all
operators that can be given an English reading are at most intensional
[i.e. content operators]” ((Kaplan, 1989a), p. 502n27). Assuming com-
position is functional application in the manner of Heim and Kratzer
(1998), the claim that all operators are “at most” intensional can be
understood as the thesis that natural language semantics need not
include the following semantic composition rule.
Monstrous functional application.
If α is a branching node and {β, γ} the set of its daughters, then
for any context c and index i: if JβKc,i is a function whose domain
contains λc, i.JγKc,i, then JαKc,i = JβKc,i(λc, i.JγKc,i).
Kaplan’s monster prohibition, then, is most naturally understood as
supported by a thesis about compositionality, namely the thesis that
the semantic composition rules are defined over Kaplanian content.
This thesis about compositonality combined with the thesis that asser-
toric content of an expression is never the character of an expression,
entails the thesis that the language fails to contain monstrous opera-
tions. Although Kaplan does not provide an explicit argument against
the existence of monsters, we can give a rational reconstruction of an
argument that is implicit in Kaplan (1989a), since he holds premises
that entail the monster ban.
Kaplan’s Master Argument against Monsters
Premise 1. The compositional semantic value of a sentence (in a
context c) is identical to “what is said” by the sentence (in c).
Premise 2.What is said by a sentence (in c) is never the character
of the sentence.
Kaplan’s sense but they will also not be monstrous, strictly speaking. So when I
say that the monster prohibition is equivalent to the claim that composition goes
down at the intensional level, this is a claim made within the restricted Kaplanian
framework where the only hyperintensional meanings floating around are characters.
Thanks to Wolfgang Schwarz and Daniel Nolan for discussion here.
25 Throughout this article I will use the standard notation from linguistic theory,
where “JφKi” is used to mean “the extension of φ at i”. I will also employ lambda
notation to talk about functions and properties. In this way “λx.x+1” refers to the
function from objects x to the successor of x. I will often use lambdas prefixed to
denotation brackets to talk about functions from various parameters to extensions,
e.g. “λw.JφKc,w” refers to the function from worlds w′ to the extension of φ at context
c and world w′ and “λc, w.JφKc,w” refers to the function from contexts c′ and worlds
w′ to the extension of φ at context c′ and world w′.
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Conclusion. Therefore, the compositional semantic value of a sen-
tence (in a context c) is never the character of the sentence. And so
a sentential operator never takes as argument the character of its
embedded subsentence in a context, i.e. no monsters.
Premise 1 of this argument is just another way to state the identi-
fication thesis (T2), thus if Kaplan does not endorse (T2), then his
implicit master argument against monsters is undercut. So here, again,
I think we have sufficient reason to conclude that Kaplan does indeed
endorse (T2): that the Kaplanian content of any complex expression
in c is determined by the Kaplanian contents (in c) of its syntactic
constituents and the way they are put together.
1.2. Composition failure in LD
What I will now argue is that Kaplan’s formal language LD, the logic of
demonstratives, is not compositional at the level of Kaplanian content.
The basic problem is a tension between Kaplan’s direct reference com-
mitments on the contents of variables and the compositional semantics
for the quantifiers of predicate logic. To demonstrate the problem I
will focus only on the fragment of Kaplan’s LD that has to do with
variables and quantification.26
In the syntax we have a set of variables, {xi}i∈N, a set of predicates
{Fni }i,n∈N (where F
n
i is an n-place predicate), the truth-functional
connectives ∧ and ¬ and the quantifiers ∀ and ∃. For these we have
the following (relevant) formation rules:
− If pi is an n-place predicate and α1, . . . , αn are variables, then
pi(α1, . . . , αn) is a formula.
− If φ is a formula and α is a variable, then ∀αφ and ∃αφ are
formulae.
For the semantics of LD we have a structure {C,W, T, U, I}, where C
is the set of contexts, W is the set of worlds, T is the set of times, U is
the set of individuals, and I is an interpretation function (which gives
extensions to predicates at circumstances j ∈ T ×W ).
A point of evaluation is a quadruple 〈c, f, t, w〉 where c ∈ C, t ∈ T ,
w ∈ W and f is an assignment function. An assignment function f is
a function from variables to individuals, f : {xi}i∈N → U . We write
f [α := i] to denote the assignment function that is just like f except
that it assigns the individual i to the variable α. And, as usual, for
26 The formal system LD is presented in Kaplan (1989a), §XV III, pp. 541-553.
In what follows I make a few notational changes to ease the exposition.
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an expression β we write JβKc,f,t,w for “the extension of β at the point
〈c, f, t, w〉” (we omit mention of the structure). Given this setup we can
recursively define 1 (or “truth”) at a point of evaluation as follows:
− JαKc,f,t,w = f(α)
− Jpiα1, . . . , αnK
c,f,t,w = 1 iff (Jα1K
c,f,t,w, . . . , JαnK
c,f,t,w) ∈ Ipi(t, w).
− J∀αφKc,f,t,w = 1 iff for all i ∈ U , JφKc,f [α:=i],t,w = 1.
− J∃αφKc,f,t,w = 1 iff there is an i ∈ U , JφKc,f [α:=i],t,w = 1.
Notice that the semantic entries for the quantifiers here are syncate-
gorematic, so it is left implicit what the exact compositional values and
rules are. But what the compositional mechanisms must be is in direct
conflict with Kaplan’s commitments on the contents of variables.
Kaplan insists that a “variable’s first and only meaning is its value”
and that they are the paradigms of directly referential terms.((Kaplan,
1989a), p. 484, (Kaplan, 1989b), pp. 571-573). Kaplan gives an explicit
account of the contents of variables and open formulae in the section
called “Remarks on the Formal System”. Here he introduces the no-
tation {α}c,f to mean “the content of α in the context c under the
assignment f” and tells us that the content of a variable is as follows.
− If α is a variable, then {α}c,f = that function which assigns to
each t ∈ T , w ∈W , JαKc,f,t,w. ((Kaplan, 1989a), p.546)
That is, the content of α at a context c and assignment f is the function
λt, w.JαKc,f,t,w, which for any input 〈t′, w′〉 outputs f(α), i.e. {α}c,f is
a constant function from circumstances to f(α). The content, then, of
a variable (or an open formula) is only given relative to an assignment
function.
Now consider the following two formulae.
(8) Fx
(9) Fy
According to Kaplan, these formulae only have content relative to a
context c and an assignment f . The context parameter c is of no
significance in this case as there are no indexicals present. But the
contents of these formulae can vary across assignment functions. Let’s
assume f assigns the same individual to ‘x’ and ‘y’, so f(‘x’) = f(‘y’).
It follows that the content of (8) at 〈c, f〉 is identical to the content of
(9) at 〈c, f〉 – in Kaplan’s notation we have: {Fx}c,f = {Fy}c,f . Now
consider the following more complex formulae.
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(10) ∀xFx
(11) ∀xFy
Clearly it could be that f(‘y’) is F without everything being F . But
then the content of (10) at 〈c, f〉 should not be the same as the content
of (11) at 〈c, f〉 – that is {∀xFx}c,f 6= {∀xFy}c,f . But, of course, if the
content of (10) and (11) at 〈c, f〉 are functions of the contents of the
quantifier ‘∀x’ and (8) and (9) at 〈c, f〉 respectively, then the contents
of (10) and (11) at 〈c, f〉 must be identical. Something has to give.
There is a clash between the claim that the content of a quantified
sentence is compositionally determined by the contents of its parts and
Kaplan’s commitments on the contents of variables and open formulae
(i.e. the claim that variables are directly referential). Let’s explicitly
state these conflicting claims.
KapCM. The Kaplanian content of any complex expression at a con-
text and assignment 〈c, f〉 is determined by the contents at 〈c, f〉 of its
syntactic constituents and the way they are put together.
KapDR. The Kaplanian content of a variable α, {α}c,f , is that func-
tion which assigns to each circumstance, f(α).
Giving up either of these will resolve the tension. KapDR is explicitly
stated in Kaplan (1989a), so I conclude that Kaplan’s LD fails to satisfy
KapCM. If LD has a compositional semantics (and it does), then it
cannot be given in terms of Kaplanian content.27
Kaplan’s LD is not compositional, under the two Kaplanian as-
sumptions that semantic composition is content composition and that
the contents of variables are constant functions.28 There are, however,
some maneuvers (analogous to those outlined above), which one might
be tempted to make at this point.
27 The semantic account of Heim and Kratzer (1998) is also not strictly composi-
tional and for a related reason. This failure is due to their Predicate Abstraction Rule
(see Heim and Kratzer (1998), pp. 186). On this theory there are lambda terms in the
object language syntax such as ‘λx.Fx’ but there is not a lexical entry for the lambda
binder ‘λx’ itself. And the semantic value of ‘λx.Fx’ isn’t (and can’t be) calculated
by composing the semantic value of ‘λx’ with the semantic value of ‘Fx’ but instead
such lambda terms are handled by the non-compositional Predicate Abstraction
Rule: Let α be a branching node with daughters β and γ, where β dominates only
a lambda binder λx. Then, for any variables assignment g, JαKg = λz.JαKg[x:=z]. Cf.
Stanley (2000), p. 395n7.
28 As far as I know this problem has not been pointed out in the literature on
Kaplan, although a similar problem relating to Kaplan and the semantics of bound
pronouns is discussed in Zimmerman (1991), §4.1.
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Someone might respond by insisting that I’ve conflated Kaplan’s
commitments about “free” variables with his commitments about “bound”
variables. In response, I need only point out that there is no such dis-
tinction between different kinds of variables in LD. There are simply
the members of {xi}i∈N, which can occur both free and bound and
there is no semantic/syntactic distinction made between them. So my
argument, which is an argument about LD is undeniable on this score.
It is true, however, that Kaplan seems to assume a semantic/syntactic
distinction between the free and bound occurrences of a variable (note
the similarity here to his treatment of the semantics of deictic and
bound uses of pronouns). It is not at all transparent how this distinc-
tion is to be implemented, so a simple appeal to a distinction between
free and bound uses of variables is just a label for the problem. And,
of course, there are various modifications to Kaplan’s syntax and/or
semantics that result in compositional and tenable semantic theories.29
From the perspective of compositional semantics it is obvious what
has gone wrong: we have assigned semantic values of the wrong type
to variables and open formulae. So, the most conservative fix would
be to give up the claim that the content of a variable is a constant
function and have the content of a variable instead be a function from
assignments to individuals. This move, however, would be to give up
the thesis KapDR (i.e. that variables are directly referential). Yet, there
doesn’t seem to be any reason stemming from issues in compositional
semantics that motivates the claim that variables are directly referential
– and reasons stemming from intuitions about “what is said” by free
variables seem suspect. A good question, then, is this: What motivated
the thesis that variables are directly referential? 30
29 For example one could insist that there are two homographic expressions in the
langauge, ‘x’, which only occurs free and ‘x’, which only occurs bound. This would
allow Kaplan to hold onto the claim that free variables are directly referential.
(This is the analogue of the Deny embedment option above.) Alternatively, one
could modify the composition principle such that we do not assign semantic values
to expressions simplicter but only to expressions-in-linguistic-enviornments. (This is
Deny innocence and probably Deny compositionality.) For an approach of this kind
see Salmon (2006). And for a discussion of altering the composition principle in
the required way see Pagin and Westerst˚ahl (2010). Of course, without independent
principled reason these moves are simply ad hoc.
30 The motivation seems to derive from issues in quantified modal logic tied up
with intuitions about “what is said” by open formulae and sub-formulae. Kaplan
says if we have a formula ∃x(Fx∧¬2Fx), then in order to evaluate the truth-value
of the component formula 2Fx (at an assignment) we must first determine what
proposition is expressed by its component formula Fx (at an assignment). And
Kaplan insists that such a proposition will be a singular proposition and ‘x’ will be
directly referential. But this seems to me to be nothing more than a case of taking
the metaphors of “aboutness” to literally. From the perspective of semantics there
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If there are good reasons to hold onto KapDR, then the other salient
strategy here would be to to deny KapCM by holding onto the commit-
ments on the (assertoric) contents of variables but giving up the claim
that LD is compositional at the level of (assertoric) content. Instead one
might insist that there is another level of “content” that does the rele-
vant compositional work. This, however, conflicts with another pillar of
Kaplanian semantics, as it amounts to allowing monstrous operations
into the language.31 In order to assess which of these is the better
option we would need to enter a long debate about the motivations for
direct reference and the monster prohibition.
The lesson I want to draw from this discussion of Kaplan’s LD is
that certain things may motivate a theorist to make claims about the
assertoric content of an expression, which turn out to be in conflict
with the thesis that the assertoric content of a complex expression
is compositionally determined by the assertoric contents of its parts.
While I am happy to admit that there are various contortions that we
could go through to avoid the conflict, I want to insist that we need
not. The fact that such a conflict might arise should neither surprise
us nor worry us, since at the outset we should not expect assertoric
content to do the work of compositional semantic value.
2. Compositionality and assertoric content
We’ve just seen a conflict between the compositionality principle and
Kaplan’s theoretical commitments on assertoric content. This type of
doesn’t seem to be any motivation for the claim that free variables are directly
referential. If we want to calculate the the truth-value of ∃x(Fx ∧ ¬2Fx) at a
point 〈g, w〉 one simply proceeds as follows (where R1 is an “accessibility” relation
on assignments – the relation of begin an x-variant – and R2 is the accessibility
relation on worlds):
J∃x(Fx ∧ ¬2Fx)Kg,w = 1 iff
there is a g′R1g such that JFx ∧ ¬2FxK
g′,w = 1 iff
there is a g′R1g such that JFxK
g′,w = 1 and J¬2FxKg
′,w = 1 iff
there is a g′R1g such that JFxK
g′,w = 1 and J2FxKg
′,w = 0 iff
there is a g′R1g such that JFxK
g′,w = 1 and there is a w′R2w such that JFxK
g′,w′ =
0.
31 See Rabern (manuscript) for a defense of the claim that if Kaplan’s LD is
compositional, then it is monstrous. Soames (2011) endorses this strategy when
discussing the Tarskian semantics for quantification but does not note the threat of
monsters.
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conflict is not constrained to certain idiosyncrasies of Kaplan’s formal
system LD – as I mentioned at the outset this case is structurally
analogous to a general tension between various contextualist theories
and the compositional semantics of embedded clauses. Remember the
slogan: expressions that say the same thing embed differently. In the
case of LD, we saw that there are contexts where ‘Fx’ and ‘Fy’ say
the same thing but embed differently under quantifiers.32 I think the
lesson to draw from looking at the embedding behavior of context-
sensitive (and assignment-sensitive) expressions is that the assertoric
content of an expression need not be identified with the compositional
semantic value of an expression, i.e. we should deny the identification
thesis.
Such a picture of the relationship between compositional semantics
and the contents of assertion has been advocated by Stanley (1997),
Stanley (2002), and most recently by Ninan (forthcoming b), Ninan
(forthcoming a), and Yalcin (2007). The classic statement of the view
was explicated and defended by Lewis (1980) as part of an objection to
the semantic theories of Kaplan (1989a) and Stalnaker (1970).33 Lewis
sums up the situation as follows, where what he calls “propositional
content” and “semantic values” are what I’ve been calling is assertoric
content and compositional values, respectively.
It would be a convenience, nothing more, if we could take the propo-
sitional content of a sentence in a context as its semantic value. But
we cannot. The propositional contents of sentences do not obey
the composition principle, therefore they are not semantic values.
((Lewis, 1980), p. 39)
32 Here I include the assignment function as a parameter of the context as sug-
gested in Kaplan (1989b), p. 591: “...context is a package of whatever parameters are
needed to determine the referent, and thus the content, of the directly referential
expressions of the language”...“Taking context in this more abstract, formal way,
as providing the parameters needed to generate content, it is natural to treat the
assignment of values to free occurrences of variables as simply one more aspect of
context”. Where compositionality is concerned I have been insisting that it was a
mistake for Kaplan to put the assignment function in the context rather than in the
index. But, of course, putting the assignment in the index seems to undermine some
important Kaplanian doctrines about direct reference, which may have more to do
with “what is said” than with compositionality.
33 Michael Dummett makes a similar distinction between the ‘assertoric content’
and ‘ingredient sense’ of an expression in terms of knowing the meaning of an
expression ‘in the sense of grasping the content of an assertion of it’ and ‘in the
sense of knowing the contribution it makes to determining the content of a complex
statement in which it is a constituent’, Dummett (1973), p. 447; see also Dummett
(1991), pp. 47–50, Stanley (1997) and Stanley (2002).
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If there is no a priori constraint on semantic theorizing that a single
type of entity plays both of these roles, we should not be worried when
the demands of compositional semantics shape “content” in a way that
is different from our best theory of assertroic content.34 Nevertheless,
the things we say and the meanings of our words must stand in a
intimate and theoretically important relationship. After all, we utter
words with certain meanings (and certain syntax) in order to say the
things we say. This platitude, however, does not call for the identifica-
tion of the two notions – all it calls for is that the assertoric content
of a sentence in a context should be systematically determined by its
compositional value. Addressing just this point Lewis states:
It is enough that the semantic value of a sentence in context should
somehow determine the assignment of propositional content. And it
does...we have the relation: sentence s is true at context c at index
i. From that we can define the propositional content of a sentence s
in context c as that proposition that is true at world w iff s is true
at c at the index iwc that results if we take the index ic of the context
c and shift its world coordinate to w. ((Lewis, 1980), p. 37-38)
The idea is to start with the compositional value of an expression at
a context and then for all parameters of the index except the world
parameter, fix its value to the value provided by the context – this
leaves us with a function from worlds to truth-values, i.e. the asser-
toric content. Whether or not Lewis is right about the exact nature of
assertoric content doesn’t matter here – it’s the more general picture
that I want to outline and endorse. Just as the extension-in-a-context
of an expression is determined by its compositional semantic value,
the assertoric-content-in-a-context of an expression is determined by
its compositional semantic value. In an important sense, then, we only
need to assign expressions a single semantic value, from which the other
values can be derived.35 With respect to assertoric content, then, we
adhere to the following principle.
34 Soames (2011) seems to endorse this general point when he says, “...the technical
demands on the semantics of temporal operators tell us nothing about whether the
semantic contents of sentences – the propositions they express – are time-neutral, or
time-specific. That issue must be resolved on independent philosophical grounds”.
35 King (2003) gives the opposite impression when glossing the view which denies
the identification thesis, he says: “...in addition to assigning sentences propositions
relative to contexts, [such a view] must assign sentences semantic values relative to
those contexts...” But there is nothing really additional to do, since once we have
assigned semantic values everything else is determined.
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Determination principle. The compositional value of an expression
α in context c determines the assertoric content of α in c.36
If we assume for illustration that compositional values are functions
from worlds, times and assignments to extensions and that assertoric
contents are functions from worlds to extensions, the relation between
assertoric content and compositional value is the relation of function
to output as in the following table.
Table I. From semantics to postsematics.
Compositional value in c Assertoric content in c Extension in c
λg, t, w.JφKc,w,t,g λw.JφKc,w,tc,gc JφKc,wc,tc,gc
For example consider the case of open formulae from §1 (and ignore the
time parameter). The compositional value of ‘Fx’ is λg, w.JFxKc,g,w,
which is a function from assignments and worlds to truth-values. But
intuitively what is said by an utterance of ‘It is F ’ is about a certain
object o (the thing assigned to ‘it’). And the information contained in
that utterance seems to be the set of worlds where o is F . The picture
here accounts for this. This object specific-content is determined by the
compositional value by saturating the assignment parameter with the
assignment determined by the context. If gc is the assignment generated
by the context such that gc(‘x’) = o, then λw.JFxK
c,gc,w is the assertoric
content of ‘Fx’ in c, i.e. the set of worlds where o is F . The picture also
aviods the conflict from §1, since it could be that the assertoric content
of ‘Fx’ and ‘Fy’ are the same in c, while the assertoric content of ‘∀xFx’
and ‘∀xFy’ are not the same in c. This is because the compositional
semantic values of ‘Fx’ and ‘Fy’ in c are not the same.
The picture that emerges is a view in which the primary job of
semantic theory is to assign to each atomic expression type of the lan-
guage a semantic value and to specify the recursive composition rules
such that the rules together with the values determine for each sen-
36 Once we make the distinction between compositional content and assertoric
content there is little reason to have compositional values be relative to contexts.
And if the language contains context-shifting operators (monsters), then there is
good reason to not have compositional values relative to contexts. For this reason,
I would ultimately prefer to take what Lewis (1980) described as “constant but
complicated” semantic values instead of “variable but simple” semantic values. In
what follows I will discuss compositional values as relative to context but only for the
sake of continuity with the discussion of Kaplan and most contemporary theorists.
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tence of the language its semantic value. This semantic value, in turn,
determines the assertoric content and truth value that the sentence
would have if uttered in a given context. Following the terminology
of MacFarlane (2003), we can call the primary job of semantics the
semantics proper and the downstream involvements the postsemantics.
The conflict between direct reference and compositionality outlined
in §1 can now be seen as arising from a conflation of issues in the
semantics proper and the postsemantics. Variables might be directly
referential in the sense that their assertoric content in a context is
simply the object that they are assigned (or a constant function to
that object) but this is consistent with their compositional value be-
ing a non-constant function from assignments to objects. Completely
analogous considerations hold for the conflict between the direct ref-
erence theory of indexicals and the compositional semantics of bound
pronouns. Under the current framework there is room for a view on
which indexicals are both directly referential in terms of “what is said”
but also shiftable in the sense that there are semantic operations that
operate on their characters – that is a monster friendly direct reference
view.37 Likewise, the apparent conflict between the eternalist about
propositons and the temporalist motivated by the compositional se-
mantics of tense is dissolved, since the eternalist may well be right
about the nature of information and the objects of assertion, while
the temporalist is right about what entities are needed for a composi-
tional semantics of tense.38 When the theoretical distinction between
assertoric content and compositional value is respected, we see that
contextualism broadly construed (i.e. including eternalism, direct ref-
erence, etc.) is primarily a theory about assertoric content, whereas
the alleged embedding problems for contextualism primarily concern
compositional values.
As attractive and natural as this picture may seem it is fair to say
that it is not the orthodox view. Is this due to certain sociological
contingencies? Or is there some devastating objection to the view? I
will now turn to one potential problem.
37 Cumming (2008) has a theory where names are treated as variables and attitude
verbs are treated as assignment shifting operators, which is very similar to such a
view.
38 Similar things can be said about certain conflicts between contextualists and
relativists about ‘might’ or ‘tasty’ that I outline at the beginning. See Ninan (forth-
coming b) and the discussion of “shiftable contextualism” for ‘might’. And see Yalcin
(2007), section 5, pp. 1006-1013.
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3. Mismatch and the semantics of speech reports
3.1. The mismatch worry
I will now address some potential problems with the view just out-
lined having to do with the semantics of speech reports (and attitude
reports generally). The alleged problem starts from the intuitive idea
that speech reports should provide a theoretical bridge between the
semantic value of the sentence embedded in the report and the as-
cribed speech content. Since on the view above the assertoric content
of a sentence can come apart from the compositional semantic value
this link is broken. And trouble, it is claimed, will inevitably ensue. In
what follows, I will attempt to make this mismatch worry more explicit
and then demonstrate that it is harmless. In so doing I will address
the objection from King (2003) stemming from apparent complications
with the interaction of temporal expressions and attitude reports. I will
argue that there is no unique problem for the view from the stand point
of the compositional semantics of attitude reports.
There is a natural thought in this vicinity that goes like this: speech
reports relate an agent to an asserted content by the use of a sentence of
the form pα says φq, where the semantic value of φ is the proposition
that α says. So the semantic value of φ must “line up” with or be
the same as the proposition that α said. For example, in the sentence
‘Bill says that snow is white’ the metaphysics calls for a relation be-
tween Bill and a proposition. But if we deny the identification thesis
and distinguish compositional values from asserted content, then the
semantics will only see a relation between Bill and a compositional
value. So it can’t be that the objects of assertion are distinct from the
compositional values of sentences.
First notice that the mere mismatch between the semanic values
of expressions and the metaphysical things that the expressions refer
to cannot be the problem. Consider the sentence ‘John loves Mary’
and assume that the semantic values of proper names are functions
from worlds to individuals (intensions). In this case, it seems that
the semantics “sees” a relation between two functions, whereas the
metaphysics “calls for” a relation between lovers – but no one should
object to such a semantics on those grounds.39
39 Similar remarks apply to a semantics which treats proper names on a par with
quantifier noun phrases as functions from functions from individuals to truth-values
to truth-values (e.g. Montague). One might object that such a view misconstrues
the assertoric content of names but there should be no objection to the semantics
per se.
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The mere mismatch between entites isn’t the worry, instead it must
be that the view is unable to get the semantics right, e.g. the seman-
tics gives a relation between a sayer and a semantic value, whereas
metaphysically there is a relation between a sayer and a proposition
and thus the semantics fails to capture the metaphysics. This is to
make the claim that sentences embedded in speech reports must have
propositions as their compositional semantic values – other entities will
not do. But this is clearly false. Constructions such as pα says φq may
well be compositional at the level of propositional content but this, of
course, does not establish that propositions are needed for the com-
positional semantics. Since if propositions (qua sets of worlds) can do
the job, then so can various finer-grained entities (e.g. sets of centered
worlds). Compare: some constructions are compositional at the level of
truth-value but they are also compositional at the level of intension.
Someone would be badly mistaken if they claimed that we need the
compositional semantic values of sentences to be truth-values because
of truth-functional operators. Our compositional semantic values and
assertoric contents stand in a vary similar relation (function/output)
to each other as do functions from worlds to truth-values and truth-
values. If there is anything to it, then this inchoate mismatch worry
must be getting at something more sophisticated.
3.2. King’s objection from tensed reports
King (2003) criticizes both Richard (1982) and Salmon (1986) for agree-
ing with Lewis (1980) that the semantic values of sentences in context
cannot be propositions (qua sets of worlds) and that one must assign
sentences compositional semantic values addition to assigning them
propositions (i.e. assertoric content).40 The problems King (2003) raises
here are very much in the spirit of the mismatch worry described above
– the things we say and believe are not what temporal (or modal)
operators operate on. I will focus on the problem raised for Salmon
(1986).41 I will give a condensed explication of Salmon’s motives and
40 In opposition to this King (2003) wants to defend the claims that “sentences can
be assigned semantic values relative to contexts in such a way that propositions are
compositionally assigned to sentences relative to context and are the [compositional]
semantic values relative to those contexts of the sentences in question. And we need
not assign sentences any second sort of semantic value.” See footnote 39.
41 I think that a similar assessment applies to King’s criticism of Richard. In short,
it is completely consistent to say that ‘Shannon believes φ’ is true just in case the
compositional semantic value of ‘φ’ is so-and so, while also maintaining that the the
semantic value of ‘φ’ is not even a candidate object of Shannon’s belief – the things
believers believe are distinct from the semantic values of sentences in a compositional
semantics.
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his semantics and then explain King’s objection to it. My assessment
will provide a partial defense of Salmon (1986) but since my main aim
here is to defend the general picture, which denies the identification
thesis, I will demonstrate that this style of objection does not even
get off the ground for the most straightforward implementation of the
general picture.
Salmon (1986), Salmon (1989) and Salmon (2003) sets out to modify
Kaplan’s semantic framework in order to accommodate the eternal
nature of information content, while at the same time providing an
adequate semantics for the temporal operators.42 Salmon summarizes
the tension that Kaplan is confronted with as follows:
Claiming that temporal operators operate on contents, and having
defined the content of a sentence as the proposition asserted by
someone in uttering the sentence, or what is said, Kaplan is forced to
construe the proposition expressed by a sentence like [‘I am writing’]
as something that may change in truth-value at different times and
in some cases even at different places. But this yields an incorrect
account of propositions. Propositions, qua objects of assertion and
belief, are eternal. ((Salmon, 2003), p. 385)
Salmon insists that Kaplan (1989a) has drawn the wrong lesson from
the fact that temporal operators need temporally neutral operands. He
says, “Contrary to Kaplan, what follows from this is that temporal
operators do not operate on propositions” ((Salmon, 2003), p. 386).
So, whereas Kaplan concludes that an adequate semantics of tempo-
ral operators requires that propositions be temporally neutral, Salmon
concludes that since propositions are not temporally neutral they must
not be what temporal operators operate on. As Salmon states in an
earlier paper:
Since they are not generally vacuous or redundant, temporal oper-
ators must operate on some aspect of their operands other than the
information content, something other than what is said in uttering
the operand. ((Salmon, 1989), p. 373)
On the one hand Kaplan defines ‘content’ to be what is said or the
information asserted by a sentence in a context – something that does
not vary in truth-value across times; while on the other hand ‘content’ is
supposed to be what operators (including temporal operators) operate
on – something that must vary in truth-value across times. Commenting
42 Salmon (2003) is in many respects the purest, clearest and most general explica-
tion of the Salmonian view in this vicinity as it attempts to be neutral with respect
to the structured Russellian propositions versus circumstantialist style semantic
theories. But I will often simply refer to Salmon (1986) as that is the work which
King (2003) mainly focuses on.
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on this tension in Kaplan, Salmon states, “Kaplan’s notion of what he
calls the ‘content’ of an expression is in fact a confused amalgamation of
the information content and the information-content base” ((Salmon,
1989), p. 373). So according to Salmon, Kaplan is unnecessarily con-
flating the objects of assertion with the arguments to the temporal
operators.
Salmon sets forth to pull these apart. His strategy is to compli-
cate the Kaplanian framework by adding a temporally neutral level
of “meaning” intermediate between character and (eternal) content,
this he calls the content base (or the “information-value base”). A
content base can be understood as being (or determining) a function
from times to contents (where contents themselves are (or determine)
functions from worlds to extensions). In this way, the compositional
values relevant for temporal operators are content bases, whereas the
objects of assertion are (eternal) contents. At this level of abstraction,
this view is very much in the spirit of the view of Lewis (1980) outlined
in §2.
King insists that following Lewis (1980) in this regard leads to
certain undesirable consequences. King’s criticism of Salmon is that
since the things that temporal operators, like ‘sometimes’, operate on
are different from the objects of the attitudes (e.g. the things we say
and believe), Salmon’s theory requires “ad hoc definitions and special
semantic clauses to handle the interaction of temporal expressions and
verbs of propositional attitude” ((King, 2003), p. 210). It is not entirely
clear what methodological principles King is appealing to here, e.g. why
it is undesirable to have special semantic clauses to handle the interac-
tions of various types of linguistic environments? But let’s grant that
the correct truth-conditions of tensed attitude reports should just “fall
out” of the correct semantics of the tense operators and the relevant
attitude verbs. King’s objection, then, is that Salmon’s semantics lacks
this virtue – and he implies that any view which shares the feature that
temporal operators operate on entities distinct from the objects of the
attitudes will also fail in this respect.
What I will show is that while it may be true that there is a certain
inelegance to Salmon’s semantic theory, this is not forced upon him due
to the fact that temporal operators operate on entities distinct from the
objects of the attitudes – instead the alleged vice of Salmon’s semantics
is a feature of his idiosyncratic structuralist propositional semantics.
King (2003) sets up a conflict between the claim that the temporal
operator ‘sometimes’ operates on the content base of its embedded
sentence and the claim that a belief ascription relates an individual to
the content of the sentence embedded in the ascription. King considers
what happens when we combine the temporal operator with a belief
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ascription such as in the following.
(12) Sometimes, John believes Frege is happy.
We know that ‘sometimes’ operates on the content base of ‘John be-
lieves Frege is happy’. But this involves the content base of ‘Frege
is happy’, which is temporally neutral. So King charges that “unless
something is done, (12) will assert that sometimes John stands in the
belief relation to an entity that changes truth-value over time...and
Salmon denies that the things believed change truth-value over time”
(King (2003), p. 210). So it seems that if temporal operators operate on
entities that are distinct from the objects of the attitudes, then we will
get undesirable results with the semantics of tensed attitude reports.
King sums up his objection as follows.
The upshot is that because for Salmon the thing that ‘Sometimes’
operates on is different from the object of the believing relation,
the semantics of sentences like (12) require special definitions and
semantic clauses...That (12) requires such things appears to me
ad hoc. It seems to me that on a proper theory, the right truth
conditions for (12) should fall out of the semantics for ‘Sometimes’,
‘believes’ and the tenses. (King (2003), p. 210)
Let’s see if this holds in general. We wish to encode the claims that
(i) ‘sometimes’ operates on the temporally neutral semantic value of
its embedded sentence and (ii) belief ascriptions relate an individual
to the eternal propositional content of the sentence embedded in the
ascription. I take it that these two claims can be fairly represented as
follows, where SOM is the temporal operator denoted by ‘sometimes’
and JbelievesK is the relation that holds between an individual and an
eternal proposition:
Clause 1. JSometimes φKc,t,w = 1 iff SOM(λt, w.JφKc,t,w) = 1 iff there
is a t′ such that JφKc,t
′,w = 1.
Clause 2. Jα believes φKc,t,w = 1 iff (JαKc,t,w, λw.JφKc,t,w) ∈ JbelievesKc,t,w.43
Clause 1 has it that ‘sometimes’ operates on the (temporally-neutral)
semantic value with respect to the context c of its embedded sentence.
43 This could also be given in terms of a relation R between an individ-
ual and a time-neutral semantic value such that R(JαKc,t,w, λt, w.JφKc,t,w) iff
(JαKc,t,w, λw.JφKc,t,w) ∈ JbelievesKc,t,w. R can also be analyzed in the style of Hin-
tikka (1969): R(JαKc,t,w, λt, w.JφKc,t,w) iff for all w′ compatible with JαKc,t,w’s beliefs
in w at t, λt, w.JφKc,t,w(t, w′) = 1.
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King insists that the semantic value of this embedded sentence must
“include” only temporally neutral semantic values. Since the semantic
value of ‘Frege is happy’ is an entity that changes truth-value over time,
King concludes that (12) will be true if and only if there is a time t′
such that John stands in the belief relation to an entity that changes
truth-value over time. We can see that the argument must be mistaken
with respect to the semantics provided by clause 1 and 2, since if we
just crunch through the semantics it is very clear that nothing special
nor ad hoc is needed. Calculate as follows:
JSometimes, John believes Frege is happy Kc,t,w = 1 iff
there is a t′ such that JJohn believes Frege is happyKc,t
′,w = 1 iff
there is a t′ such that (JJohnKc,t




The right result just “falls out” of the simple clauses 1 and 2. Nothing
here is ad hoc and we haven’t had to posit special semantic clauses
to “eternalize” semantic values. This demonstrates that the mere fact
that temporal operators operate on entities distinct from the objects
of the believing relation is unproblematic.44
4. Conclusion
There is a theoretical distinction between the objects of assertion and
compositional values, which we should respect. Theorists working on
the nature of assertoric content (or mental content and information)
44 The special definition of the eternalization of a content base is an artifact of the
specific structuralist or Russellian framework that Salmon (1986) is developing. This
is why when we calculate through the pure truth-conditional semantics – without
taking the detour through structured contents – no issues arise. Salmon’s semantic
theory proceeds in two steps: (i) a recursive assignment of structured content bases
(and structured contents) to every expression of the language with respect to a
context, assignment (and time), and (ii) a recursive definition of the truth of a
structured content base (and structured content) with respect to a circumstance
(i.e. a world and a time). These together provide a recursive definition of sentential
truth at a point of evaluation. Combining Salmon’s definition of the associated
structured contents and content bases for the problem sentence (12) with Salmon’s
definition of truth of a content and content base at a circumstance, provides the
following overall definition of (12)’s sentential truth at a point of evaluation: (12)
is true at a point (c, g, t, w) if and only if there is time t′ such that John and the
proposition expressed by ‘Frege is happy’ at c, g, t′ stand in the belief relation at t′
in w.
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should welcome this distinction, as it allows them to theorize about
the nature of content, somewhat liberated from the confines of the
strict compositionality principle. Likewise, theorists working in formal
semantics should welcome this distinction as they need not worry if
the semantic values they posit don’t always cohere with the intuitive
notions of “what is said”. Of course, there is not total freedom, since
the theories should still conform to the determination principle. But
we have seen that certain puzzles in philosophy of language completely
dissolve from this methodological perspective.
Return to the embedding problem for contextualism about epistemic
modals. The contextualist holds that, in a given context, utterances
of sentences (5.1) and (5.2) assert the same thing. But this allegedly
conflicts with the compositional semantics of sentence (5.3) where (5.1)
occurs as a syntactic constituent.
(5.1) Dave might be in Oxford.
(5.2) It is consistent with what I know that Dave is in Oxford.
(5.3) Leon said that Dave might be in Oxford.
We now see that sentences (5.1) and (5.2) may well have the same
assertoric content as the contextualist insists but this doesn’t cause a
problem for the compositional semantics – since the semantic value
of (5.1) isn’t the same as its assertoric content. The compositional
semantics of (5.3) can be given in terms of the semantic value of ‘Leon
said’ applied to the agent-neutral semantic value of ‘Dave might be in
Oxford’.45
I challenge theorists who adhere to the identification thesis to give
either a direct argument in its favor or a substantial objection to the
views that deny it. Why should we think that the things we say are
identical to the things our sentences mean?
45 To see how this works in detail we need semantic clauses for ‘might’ and ‘says’
(cf. Ninan (forthcoming b)). Let Jβ says φKc,w,t,a = 1 iff all w′ compatible with
what β says in w at t are such that JφKc,w
′,t,β = 1. And let Jmight φKc,w,t,a = 1 iff
there is a world w′ compatible with what a knows at t in w such that JφKc,w
′,t,a = 1.
With these semantic clauses in place we can calculate the semantic value of (5.3).
JLeon says Dave might be in OxfordKc,w,t,a = 1 iff
all w′ compatible with what Leon says in w at t are such that JDave might be in
OxfordKc,w
′,t,Leon = 1 iff
all w′ compatible with what Leon says in w at t are such that there is a world w′′
compatible with what Leon knows at t in w′ such that JφKc,w
′′,t,Leon = 1.
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